Suchergebnisse

Auf der Grundlage der Systemtheorie hat Gunther Teubner eine soziologisch informierte Rechts- und Verfassungstheorie entwickelt, die nicht vom souveränen Staat, sondern von der funktional differenzierten Gesellschaft ausgeht. Anders als die überkommene Staatsrechtslehre annimmt, kann es Recht und Verfassung danach auch ohne Staat geben: einerseits in transnationalen Politikprozessen, andererseits in den "privaten" Bereichen der Weltgesellschaft. Die Suche nach Einheit und Hierarchie des Rechts mag unter diesen Umständen vergeblich sein. Eine Vernetzung der verschiedenen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Verfassungsfragmente kann Teubner zufolge aber durch ein neuartiges Kollisionsrecht nach dem Vorbild des Internationalen Privatrechts gelingen. Mit Beiträgen vonIno Augsberg, Anna Beckers, Gralf-Peter Calliess, Pasquale Femia, Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Andreas Maurer, Riccardo Prandini, Ralf Seinecke, Thomas Vesting, Lars Viellechner.

Abstract:International law sometimes fails to regulate cross-border affairs due to a lack of consent or pace among the states. As a consequence, transnational governance arrangements, which are established by contract mainly among non-state actors, step in to fill the gap. The arrangement that allocates domains on the Internet offers the most sophisticated example to date. The present article argues that a new approach to the horizontal effect of constitutional rights may both account for the emergence of such arrangements and offer a solution to the problem of their legitimacy. According to this understanding, constitutional rights at the same time enable and restrict transnational regulation. In this way, they guarantee a comprehensive protection of freedom under conditions of globalisation. As long as transnational governance arrangements are not able to generate constitutional rights of their own, however, the national legal orders must complement them. Hence, the legitimacy of law in world society may only be ensured through a dialectical process of internal and external constitutionalisation, resulting from the interaction of its various constituents.

According to the author of this article, two topics dominated the international news before the U.S. presidential election in 2004: 1) the U.N. Secretary General Annan's condemnation of the Iraq war as illegal, & 2) the Russian President Putin's decision to sign the Kyoto Protocol. To the author, both of these news items illustrate "American unilateralism.' In the former example, the U.S. evaded existing forms of international cooperation by attacking Iraq without a mandate from the U.N. Security Council. In the latter case, the U.S. opposed new forms of international cooperation when they refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The article: 1) describes how to understand U.S. unilateralism; 2) examines the legal justification, & 3) critically assesses these both. The author contends that the U.S. argument [of basing unilateral action on the U.S. Constitution] cannot be justified. However, such constitutional debate can contribute to the concept of "international constitutional law.'. References. A. Kallioinen